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Macroeconomic Regimes, Policies,
and Outcomes in the World  
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel 
Abstract
This paper summarizes a research project focused on the empirical determinants of 
and interrelations between macroeconomic regimes, policies, and performance in the 
world. The project’s hypotheses are structured into three related themes. The first aim 
is analyzing the determinants of the likelihood of adoption of macroeconomic policy 
regimes. The second project theme focuses on cyclicality of macroeconomic policies 
and accuracy in attaining inflation targets. Finally, the project tests for the behavior of 
two key macroeconomic variables - economic growth and inflation – focusing on their 
sensitivity to different macroeconomic regimes and policies. A large world database 
was assembled for this project from both publicly available and private databases. 
Data coverage extends to more than 100 countries, with annual time series extending 
from 1970 to 2008. A wide spectrum of frontier estimation techniques is applied to the 
country panel data series, appropriate for discrete-choice and continuous variable 
estimation. The key research results are the following. Country choice of 
macroeconomic policy regimes (exchange-rate regimes, money-based targeting, 
inflation targeting, and rule-based fiscal regimes) is explained by countries’ structural 
and institutional features, macroeconomic performance, financial development, and 
international integration. The cyclical behavior of fiscal policy reflects the quality of 
country institutions, financial openness, and financial development. Central bank 
accuracy in meeting inflation targets is also a result of domestic institutional strength 
and macroeconomic credibility. Long-term growth is significantly shaped by the quality 
of policies, financial development, foreign aid, and exchange-rate misalignment, in 
addition to standard growth determinants. Growth volatility is a result of domestic 
macroeconomic policy volatility, external shocks, international integration, and 
financial development. Country inflation rates are determined by international factors 
and domestic determinants, including fiscal policy, institutional development, 
monetary and exchange-rate regimes, and financial depth and integration. 
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1. Introduction
Macroeconomic regimes and policies evolve over time. Fifty years ago the conduct of 
monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate policies was opaque, discretionary, and unpredictable, not 
bound by well-defined policy regimes, institutions, and rules. Slowly since the 1980s, and more 
quickly since the 1990s and 2000s, macroeconomic policy regimes have been strengthened by 
the adoption of macroeconomic institutions (like independent central banks and fiscal 
councils), new policy regimes (like inflation targeting and fiscal rules), and more transparent 
policy decisions that are bound by ex-ante rules and ex-post accountability (like monetary 
policy decisions by modern central banks). This has been the result of a growing consensus 
among policymakers and academics that rules are better than discretion – both for democratic 
accountability and economic efficiency. Certainly the latter objective has been intellectually 
supported by modern macroeconomic theory shaped by the rational expectations revolution, 
the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976), and the arguments in support of policy rules over discretion 
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977). 
The evolution in macroeconomic regimes and policies is likely to have contributed to 
macroeconomic stabilization. After the Great Inflation period of the 1970s and 1980s (when 
industrial countries experienced abnormally persistent two-digit inflation rates and many 
developing countries lived through high and hyper-inflation episodes) came the Great 
Moderation that started in the late 1980s and early 1990s, leading most countries to converge 
to one-digit inflation rates at the start of the third millennium. If the Great Recession of 2007-
2008 will mark a return to macroeconomic instability in the future or is only a footnote in the 
world’s conquest of low inflation and overall macroeconomic stability is still to be seen. 
Moreover, the experience of this deep recession may put into question the usefulness of the 
dominant macroeconomic regimes and policies that have been adopted during the last 
decade.
Hence it is useful to take stock of the relations between macroeconomic regimes, 
policies, and outcomes observed in the world during the last decades. There is a growing but 
still partial empirical literature on the latter relations, which often shows ambiguous or non-
robust results on the determinants of the choice of macroeconomic regimes, the effectiveness 
of macroeconomic policies in attaining their objectives, and the structural and policy-related 
drivers of macroeconomic outcomes.
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Motivated by the open issues of the latter literature, and in close collaboration with 
several colleagues, I have carried out a research agenda that addresses the following 
questions:
(i) Which structural and performance-related variables determine the adoption of 
macroeconomic regimes, i.e., exchange-rate regimes, monetary regimes (money, inflation, and 
exchange-rate targets), and rule-based fiscal regimes?
(ii) What determines the success of macroeconomic policies in their counter-cyclical role and 
of monetary policy in attaining inflation targets?
(iii) Which structural and policy-related variables determine macroeconomic performance 
measured by growth levels, growth volatility, and inflation?   
In order to respond to the latter questions, this research agenda revisits and extends 
previous hypotheses on the empirical determinants of and interrelations between
macroeconomic regimes, policies, and outcomes. We subject many behavioral hypotheses to 
empirical scrutiny for the largest possible world data base (covering more than 100 countries, 
with annual time series that extend, at most, from 1970 to 2008), and using a battery of 
frontier panel-data estimation techniques.
This paper summarizes the key results of this research agenda, without reporting the 
batteries of robustness tests for alternative specifications, estimation methods, and sub-
samples that can be found in the 12 individual papers that comprise this project. I also abstract 
from a detailed review of related literature, presented in the individual papers.
Section 2 summarizes estimation methods and data used in this project. Then I turn to 
the main hypotheses and report empirical results on macroeconomic regime choice (section 
3), success of macroeconomic policies (section 4), and macroeconomic performance (section 
5). I conclude briefly in section 6.
2. Estimation Methods and Data
The general estimation model for macroeconomic panels used in testing the empirical 
models encompasses the lagged dependent variable, two vectors of independent variables, 
interaction terms between sub-groups of independent variables, interaction terms between 
sub-groups of independent variables and group-specific dummy variables, and country and 
time effects:   
(1) ti,titi,ti,ti,ti,qt,i,kt,i,ti,ti,1)t(i,ti, εvu)'D(z')D(x)'z(x'zβ'x'yy   
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where yit is a continuous or discrete-choice dependent variable for macroeconomic regimes, 
policy outcomes or performance measures, xit is a vector of exogenous variables, zit is a vector 
of exogenous variables, Di,t is a vector of binary dummy variables that clusters independent 
variables into different country groups or time periods, ui is a country effect, vt is a time effect, 
and εi,t is a stochastic error term. Possible interaction effects between exogenous variables are 
denoted by the vector product of xi,t,k and zi,t.q, which are conforming sub-vectors of xi,t and zi,t, 
respectively. In order to test in a nested way for differences in behavior across different 
country groups and/or different time periods, interaction effects between exogenous variables 
and binary country-group and time-period dummy variables, Di,t , are also introduced.
A large array of panel estimation techniques are used in the empirical research 
reported below. Linear estimation techniques are applied to continuous dependent variables, 
both for static and dynamic models. Non-linear models are used in the case of the following 
discrete-choice dependent variable techniques: random-effects probit and logit estimators, 
fixed-effects logit estimator, and fixed-effects instrumental-variable probit estimator. Finally, 
several models are used for dynamic specifications: Markov chain models, error-correction 
models, mean group and pooled mean group estimators (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999), 
dynamic fixed effects estimators, generalized method of moment (GMM) estimators (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) and system generalized method of moment estimators (SGMM) estimators 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Most estimators are applied to annual 
data frequencies, while GMM and SGMM are applied to data for five-year averages.
A large world database was assembled for this project from both publicly available and 
private databases. The project’s database comprises a wide range of macroeconomic and 
financial variables, as well as qualitative/discrete institutional and economic-regime variables. 
Data coverage extends to at most 112 countries, with annual time series extending at most 
from 1970 to 2008. The data used in each particular empirical model is a subset of the full data 
base, using only part of the country and time span mentioned above, reflected in panel sizes 
that extend from 287 to 2305 country-year observations.
3. Choice of Macroeconomic Regimes
I focus on three categories of macroeconomic regimes: exchange-rate (ER) systems 
(choice of ER regimes determined by the degree of ER flexibility), monetary regimes (selection 
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of nominal anchors for the conduct of monetary policy), and rule-based fiscal regimes (choice 
of fiscal rules).
A world trend toward adoption of flexible ERs is observed since the mid-1990s, as 
documented in Figure 1. Some countries may peg their currency to gain credibility and control 
of domestic inflation, while others may be more prone to float due to the larger exposure to 
real shocks. There is an empirical literature on the factors considered by countries in selecting 
their ER arrangements. Yet its results are not robust due to lack of consistent regime 
measures, small data samples, or limited use of alternative specifications and econometric 
techniques (Edison and Melvin, 1990; Juhn and Mauro, 2002; Beker, 2006).
In Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008a), we attempt to address the latter issues by 
using a sample of up to 110 countries with annual information over the period 1975-2005, 
using a de facto ER classification and a general specification that encompasses macroeconomic 
conditions, optimum currency area (OCA) conditions, and variables consistent with the 
financial approach (Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Reggio, 2006).
Representative results for the likelihood of having in place a non-flexible (fixed or 
intermediate) ER system are reported in Table 1. First, we find that countries with lower 
current-account surpluses (or higher deficits), little real ER misalignment, and higher inflation 
are more prone to adopt ER pegs. Second, factors associated with OCA conditions are good 
predictors of ER regimes: countries that are smaller in size, with higher trade openness, and 
larger correlation of domestic inflation with world inflation are more likely to peg their 
currencies. Finally, factors related to the financial approach are also significant determinants of 
ER regime choice: countries that exhibit more financial openness and higher financial
development are more likely to adopt floating regimes.
Monetary regimes are defined by the choice of nominal anchors in the conduct of 
monetary policy: an ER target, a money growth target or an inflation target. Figure 2 reflects 
country distribution by explicit adoption of money-growth and inflation targets during 1975-
2005; countries not counted there use either ER anchors or no explicit unique nominal anchor. 
While the number of money-growth targeting (MGT) countries does not show any clear time 
trend, the number of inflation-targeting (IT) countries grows from one in 1990 to 25 in 2005. 
Next I refer to our estimation results for the likelihood of, first, having a MGT regime in place 
(against all other alternative explicit or implicit monetary regimes) and, second, having an IT 
regime in place (again, against all other monetary regimes).
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In Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008b), we test for the likelihood of having MGT in 
place, using a sample of 55 countries with annual information covering 1975-2005. In the 
absence of any previous research on the choice of a money-growth target, we conduct our 
empirical research on the likelihood of having a MGT regime in place, identifying several 
structural variables that potentially affect the choice of MGT against alternative monetary 
regimes. Representative results are reported in Table 2. We find that the likelihood of having a 
MGT regime in place declines with monetary instability (which makes attainment of a money 
growth target more difficult), the government budget balance (which reduces the need for 
monetary financing of government deficits), domestic financial development (which may 
contribute both to larger monetary instability and the development of domestic public debt 
markets), and trade openness (which may contribute to weaker control of domestic money 
supply).
IT has become the monetary policy framework of choice in many industrial and 
developing countries. Since the pioneering start of IT by New Zealand in 1990, 30 countries 
have switched to IT until 2009 (Schmidt-Hebbel 2010). The early literature on IT identified pre-
conditions that should be met at the time of IT adoption to ensure success of the new regime 
(Masson et al., 1997, Bernanke et al., 1999). Yet Batini and Laxton (2007) contradicted the 
preceding literature, showing that most inflation targeters (including most industrial-country 
inflation targeters) were far from satisfying the latter pre-conditions at the time they started 
IT. It took most IT countries many years after they started IT before  putting in place economic 
and institutional conditions that characterize a fully-fledged IT regime.
The empirical literature on the likelihood of having IT in place has identified a limited 
number of potential determinants (Gerlach, 1999; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002; Carare 
and Stone, 2003; Hu, 2006). This literature presents several shortcomings, including narrow 
specifications, lack of robustness testing, lack of time dimension, and small sample size. In 
Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008c), we attempt to overcome the latter limitations by 
testing for a broad specification subject to a battery of estimation techniques and using a 
panel sample of up to 104 countries with annual information covering 1975-2005. 
A representative set of results for the determinants of the likelihood of having IT in 
place is reported in Table 3. Among usually mentioned prerequisites for IT, we find that lower 
inflation (an acceptable degree of monetary stabilization), a higher government budget 
balance (which reduces the need for fiscal dominance over monetary policy), and a flexible 
exchange-rate regime (the absence of a competing nominal anchor for monetary policy) raise 
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significantly the likelihood or having in place an IT regime. Domestic financial development and 
trade openness also contribute to raise the likelihood of IT. Finally, IT is more likely to be 
implemented in richer countries.
The absence of adequate fiscal rules during the boom years that preceded the recent 
global financial crisis and the subsequent fiscal response to the crisis and recession in the U.S., 
as well as the repeated failures of the fiscal rule based on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
in the EU, explain the new worldwide support to stronger fiscal rules in order to support fiscal 
sustainability and counter-cyclical fiscal policy (Bernanke, 2010 for the U.S.). Now a growing 
number of countries are planning to reform their fiscal policy regimes, adopting explicit fiscal 
rules aimed at contributing to stabilize more effectively business cycles and make public 
finances more resilient to political pressure.
In fact, before the global crisis – and still now – only a minority of countries had in 
place a fiscal regime based on an explicit fiscal rule. Figure 3 depicts the time trend of the 
number of countries with a fiscal rule in place during 1975-2005: the number has risen steadily 
since 3 countries during most of the 1970s and 1980s, showing a significant increase with the 
Maastricht (or SGP) conditions for prospective euro zone members in 1997, and climbing to a 
world total of 30 countries in 2005. 
What determines the adoption of fiscal rules? The study of possible macroeconomic 
and institutional determinants behind the choice of a fiscal regime has been an unexplored 
area. In Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008d) we attempt to fill this void by providing an 
assessment of the determinants of the likelihood of adopting and holding to fiscal rules that 
constrain the exercise of fiscal policy. We test for a broad specification subject to a battery of 
panel-data estimation techniques and using a panel sample of 75 countries (of which at most 
24 had a fiscal rule in place) with annual information covering 1975-2005. Representative 
results for the determinants of the likelihood of having a rule-based fiscal regime in place are 
summarized in Table 4. On one hand, fiscal policy strength (measured by the government 
budget balance) and government stability (reflected by International Country Risk Guide –
ICRG – measures of governments’ abilities to stay in office and carry out their programs) are 
significant in determining adoption of fiscal rules. On the other hand, high population shares of 
young and old people (high dependency ratios), which add pressure on government budgets, 
and pro-cyclical government expenditure behavior, are significant deterrents to adopting fiscal 
rules. Richer countries are more likely to adopt fiscal rules than poorer nations. Therefore our 
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results suggest that countries invest significantly in institutional conditions that affect fiscal 
policy execution and performance when adopting and having in place fiscal rules.
4. Success of Macroeconomic Policies
Now I turn to the determinants of success (or lack thereof) of macroeconomic policies. 
I focus selectively on two dimensions of macroeconomic policy performance: cyclicality of both 
fiscal and monetary policies and accuracy of monetary policy in attaining inflation targets.
Macroeconomic policies are geared in principle toward stabilizing business-cycle 
fluctuations. There is evidence on the ability of industrial economies to conduct counter-
cyclical fiscal policies (Lane, 2003a; Lane, 2003b; Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008). 
However, in contrast to industrial economies, earlier research suggested that monetary and 
fiscal policies were predominantly pro-cyclical, both in Latin America and other developing 
regions (Hausmann and Stein, 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997a; Gavin and Hausmann, 1998; 
Talvi and Végh, 2005; Lane, 2003a; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004).
Developing economies comprise a highly heterogeneous country group that exhibits 
large differences in policy credibility, institutional development, and financial depth. Previous 
work has established empirically that policy credibility and institutional development 
contribute significantly to macroeconomic policy cyclicality in emerging economies (Calderón 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003; Calderón, Duncan, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2004). The latter research 
shows that fiscal and macroeconomic policy are (independently) more likely to follow a 
counter-cyclical stance when country risk premiums are lower and institutions are more 
developed.  
In Calderón, Duncan, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010), we broaden our previous 
research significantly by extending it to 112 countries over 1984-2008, testing for several 
specifications and using several panel-data estimation techniques. Selective results are 
reported in tables 5 and 6. The results for the extended Taylor equation for the monetary 
policy rate reflect a significant positive interaction effect between the output gap and 
ICRG’s aggregate measure of institutional quality (Table 5). The results imply that when 
countries display high (low) levels of institutional quality, monetary policy acts counter-
(pro-) cyclically. Analogous results are obtained for fiscal policy, reflecting a significant 
negative interaction effect between government spending and the output gap (Table 6). 
These results imply that countries where institutional development is high (low), 
government spending follows a counter- (pro-) cyclical pattern. In sum, the quality of 
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institutions, not the dividing line between industrial and emerging economies, explains the 
cyclical pattern of macroeconomic policies in the world.
  It has also been argued that political systems with multiple fiscal veto points 
(highly correlated with democracy) are more likely to exhibit fiscal policy pro-cyclicality 
(Stein et al., 1998; Talvi and Végh, 2005) and that limited access to domestic and 
international financial markets hinders the ability of governments to pursue counter-
cyclical fiscal policy (Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti, and Talvi, 1996; Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2004; Riascos and Végh, 2004). Therefore we extend our study of fiscal 
policy cyclicality in Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008e) by adding further potential 
determinants: the extent of democracy and measures of domestic financial depth and 
international financial integration. We subject the latter hypothesis to a large array of 
estimation techniques based on alternative specifications applied to different fiscal policy 
measures, using a large data sample covering 90 countries during 1970-2005.
Selective results are reported in Table 7. They show that the budget balance ratio 
to GDP behaves pro-cyclically in countries with (independently) low levels of external 
financial openness, low domestic financial depth, low institutional quality, and/or 
democratic regimes. As the significant interaction effects between the latter variables and 
the output gap reflect, the opposite is true in countries that are highly developed – both 
financially and institutionally – and countries with non-democratic regimes. Looking behind 
the government balance, next we test separately for the cyclical properties of government 
revenue and expenditure ratios to GDP. The results are surprising as they show that all the 
cyclical properties of the budget balance are driven by the cyclical properties of the 
expenditure ratio to GDP, none by the revenue ratio. In fact, the revenue ratio to GDP is a-
cyclical and no interaction term appears to be significantly different from zero. By contrast, 
the cyclical term and all interaction effects are highly significant determinants of the 
government expenditure ratio to GDP – like in the case of the government balance ratio, 
but obviously exhibiting opposite signs. We conclude that government expenditure – which 
is largely discretionary in most countries – drives the cyclical stance of government 
balances in the world, and its cyclical pattern is shaped by financial openness, financial 
depth, institutional quality, and the political regime.
Monetary policy success hinges on consistent central bank behavior and strong 
private-sector credibility. As discussed above, a rising number of central banks is aiming at 
stronger credibility and improved monetary policy effectiveness by committing to explicit 
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inflation targets. Have the latter banks succeeded in meeting their targets and what explains 
their success – or lack thereof? In Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), we address the latter 
questions by measuring IT performance in the world population of IT countries, identifying the 
role of fundamental determinants and measures of institutional and macroeconomic 
performance in the success (or lack thereof) in meeting inflation targets, controlling for 
external and domestic shocks. We apply several panel-data estimation techniques to different 
specifications for inflation misses (the absolute deviation of inflation rates from official target 
levels), based on quarterly 1990-2003 data for the world sample of inflation-targeting 
countries. Selective results are reported in Table 8.
We control for several variables that account for part of the variance of inflation 
misses, including current and lagged values of oil price shocks and nominal exchange-rate 
shocks. Our two fundamental variables are central bank independence (a potentially key 
institutional factor driving monetary independence) and macroeconomic credibility (proxied by 
sovereign debt premiums). Both latter variables are significant determinants. Central bank 
independence lowers annualized inflation deviations from targets by some 20 basis points and 
a 100-point reduction in sovereign country risk spreads reduces inflation misses by some 10 
basis points. 
5. Macroeconomic Performance
Now I turn to the determinants of macroeconomic performance measures. I focus 
selectively on two key macroeconomic indicators: economic growth (both its level and 
volatility measures) and inflation.
Trade and financial openness and integration have exploded in the world at large and 
its major regions since the 1970s (Figures 4 and 5). A growing body of empirical literature has 
focused on the contribution of trade and financial openness on country growth levels, with 
ambiguous results. This motivated a fresh look at the evidence on the links between economic 
growth, external openness, and foreign shocks (trade and financial shocks; price and quantity 
shocks) in a large world panel sample, presented in Calderón, Loayza, and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2006). There we reported that trade and financial openness (or integration) contribute 
positively and significantly to growth, controlling for four types of external shocks and 
domestic growth determinants. Moreover, there we provided evidence that financial 
integration reduces the sensitivity of growth to foreign shocks, while trade integration 
magnifies or dampens foreign shocks, depending on the type of shock.
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In subsequent work, Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) assess the effects of 
civil wars, foreign aid, and real ER misalignment on growth in a world sample of 77 countries 
during the 1970-2004 period, using the system GMM-IV estimator. Selective results are 
reported in Table 9. Standard control variables found in the empirical panel growth literature 
are included here, among which I only mention the significant negative influence of inflation 
on growth. Not surprisingly, peace onset and post-conflict periods affect growth. Foreign aid 
has a highly non-monotonic and significant effect on growth: low to moderate aid flows 
(relative to recipients’ GDP level) raise growth while large aid flows reduce growth. Real ER 
misalignment (measured as real ER overvaluation) reduces growth. Financial development 
raises growth directly and, in addition, dampens the negative growth effect of ER 
overvaluation (as captured by their positive significant interaction effect). Moreover, real ER 
overvaluation interacts negatively with foreign aid, therefore reducing the positive effects of 
moderate aid flows and exacerbating the negative effects of large aid flows.
Now I shift to subsequent work on the influence of openness on the second moment 
of growth. In Calderón, Loaza, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), we focus on the determinants of 
the standard deviation of GDP growth using the GMM system estimator applied to a world 
panel of 75 countries for five-year periods covering 1970-2000. Selective results are 
summarized in Table 10, which identifies the individual effects of four types of shocks, as well 
as their combined effect, on growth volatility. Controlling for significant domestic factors that 
raise growth volatility (inflation volatility, exchange-rate overvaluation, and systemic banking 
crises), the results reflect three consistent findings across most types of shocks. First, trade 
openness raises growth volatility while financial openness lowers growth volatility. Second, the 
volatility of most of the four types of foreign shocks raises growth volatility.  Third, the 
significant interaction effects between openness and foreign shocks show that trade openness 
exacerbates the positive effects of foreign shocks on growth volatility while financial openness 
dampens the positive effects of foreign shocks on growth volatility.     
Complementary results are reported by Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008f), based 
on similar data for 82 countries, covering 1975-2005, and using similar estimation techniques. 
Selective baseline results are summarized in Table 11. Among domestic conditions, fiscal and 
monetary policy volatility appear now as significant positive contributors to growth volatility. 
Trade openness does not affect growth volatility while financial openness dampens 
significantly growth volatility. Among external conditions, terms-of-trade volatility does not 
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affect growth volatility but international real interest rate volatility raises significantly growth 
volatility.   
What drives inflation in the world? In Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010) we address 
this question by identifying the empirical role of non-monetary inflation determinants in a 
world panel sample for 97 countries spanning 1975-2005. We extend the previous literature by 
specifying a broad inflation model that encompasses partial models found previously, applying 
several estimation techniques and testing for different linear and non-linear model 
specifications. Table 12 reports selective baseline results. The findings show that, controlling 
for high and hyper-inflation episodes and external inflation, either an IT regime or a fixed ER 
regime contribute to lower inflation. In countries under either regime, annual inflation declines 
by roughly 3% in comparison to inflation in other countries. The result that IT reduces average 
inflation is due to the fact that the control group is comprised by all non-IT countries. If the 
control group were comprised only by low-inflation industrial countries, this result would 
vanish, as shown by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007). The fiscal theory of inflation is 
validated by the significant contribution of fiscal deficits to inflation. More financial openness 
contributes to lower inflation. 
6. Conclusions
I have summarized in this paper the findings of a large research project conducted with 
several co-authors over the last years. This research agenda has focused on the empirical 
determinants of (and interrelations between) macroeconomic regimes, policies, and 
performance in the world. Motivated by a large previous literature that often yields scattered, 
ambiguous and even contradictory results, this research project has developed a more 
systematic empirical search of the determinants of macroeconomic regimes, policies, and 
outcomes in the world at large.
The project’s hypotheses are structured into three related themes: the likelihood of 
adoption of macroeconomic policy regimes, the success of macroeconomic policies, and the 
performance of two key macroeconomic variables. A large world database was assembled for 
this project from both publicly available and private databases. Data coverage extends to more 
than 100 countries, with annual time series extending, at most, from 1970 to 2008. A wide 
spectrum of frontier estimation techniques was applied to the country panel data series, 
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appropriate for discrete-choice and continuous variable estimation. The key research results 
are the following.
Country choice of macroeconomic policy regimes (exchange-rate regimes, money 
growth targeting, inflation targeting, and rule-based fiscal regimes) is explained by countries’ 
structural and institutional features, good macroeconomic performance, financial 
development, and international integration. The cyclical behavior of fiscal policy reflects the 
quality of country institutions, financial openness, and financial development. Central bank 
accuracy in meeting inflation targets is also a result of domestic institutional strength and 
macroeconomic credibility. Long-term growth is significantly shaped by the quality of policies, 
financial development, foreign aid, and exchange-rate misalignment, in addition to standard 
growth determinants. Growth volatility is a result of domestic policy volatility, external shocks, 
international integration, and financial development. Country inflation rates are determined 
by international factors and domestic determinants, including fiscal policy, institutional 
development, monetary and exchange-rate regimes, and financial depth and openness. 
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Table 1
Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
Dependent variable: dummy for the Exchange Rate Regime (flexible=0, fixed=1)
Estimation methods: Discrete-choice logit panel-data models
Sample: 42-66 Countries, 1975-2005
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Macroeconomic conditions
    Current account surplus
    Real exchange rate misalignment
    Inflation
OCA conditions
    Trade openness
    Country size
    GDP per capita
    Inflation correlation
Financial approach
    Financial openness
    Financial development
Constant
-9.228 ***
(2.69)
-4.201 ***
(2.83)
7.626 ***
(3.99)
2.346 **
(2.09)
-4.138 ***
(3.51)
2.879
(1.61)
2.253 ***
(6.14)
-1.894 ***
(3.77)
-4.372 ***
(4.08)
-
-
-10.091 ***
(3.82)
-4.255 ***
(3.74)
7.257 ***
(4.98)
0.724
(1.34)
-0.512 ***
(3.41)
0.402 *
(1.68)
2.429 ***
(8.16)
-0.393 **
(2.39)
-1.558 ***
(3.00)
10.732 ***
(2.97)
Observations
Countries
LR statistic
p-value
832
42
270.9
0.00
1365
66
203.1
0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2
Choice of Money Growth Targeting Regime
Dependent variable: dummy for Money Growth Targeting Regime (Money Growth Targeting=1; non-
Money Growth Targeting=0)
Estimation methods: Discrete-choice logit panel-data models
Sample: 22-55 Countries, 1975-2005
Fixed Effects Pooled Random Effects
Financial development
Money instability (5 years)
Government budget balance
GDP per capita
Trade openness
Constant
-0.936 **
(2.03)
-0.64 **
(2.24)
-13.932 ***
(2.88)
-
-
-2.234 **
(1.99)
1.675 ***
(2.70)
0.285 ***
(2.85)
-0.054
(1.39)
-4.987 ***
(4.65)
-
-
-1.108 ***
(6.87)
-0.400 ***
(3.13)
-1.542 ***
(3.74)
-0.282 **
(2.27)
-8.699 ***
(2.95)
-
-
-2.044 **
(2.54)
0.029
(0.04)
Observations
Countries
  Countries with a MGT regime
  Countries without a MGT regime
  (control group)
LR statistic
p-value
473
22
22
0
39.53
0.00
1096
55
22
33
95.59
0.00
1096
55
22
33
38.32
0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3
Choice of Inflation Targeting Regime
Dependent variable: dummy for the Inflation Targeting Regime (Inflation Targeting=1; non-Inflation 
Targeting=0)
Estimation methods: Discrete-choice logit panel-data models
Sample: 19-98 Countries, 1975-2005
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Inflation
Government budget balance
Financial development
Exchange rate regime
GDP per capita
Trade openness
Dummy for Latin American 
Countries
Constant
-130.026 ***
(2.95)
-25.066
(1.45)
19.872 ***
(3.07)
-20.320 ***
(3.03)
104.027***
(3.19)
46.763 ***
(2.83)
-
-
-
-
-117.311 ***
(3.18)
-
-
16.881 ***
(3.39)
-17.824 ***
(3.22)
90.130 ***
(3.56)
42.343 ***
(3.03)
-
-
-
-
-36.421 ***
(5.88)
17.909 **
(2.53)
3.186 ***
(3.40)
-4.464 ***
(7.20)
3.478 ***
(3.49)
0.837
(0.68)
-
-
-30.343***
(3.44)
-39.508 ***
(6.63)
-
-
2.633 ***
(2.99)
-3.990 ***
(7.74)
4.822 ***
(5.90)
3.185 ***
(4.01)
7.433 ***
(4.85)
-47.961 ***
(7.01)
Observations
Countries
  Countries with a IT regime
  Countries without a IT regime
  (control group)
LR statistic
p-value
491
19
19
0
450.19
0.00
554
24
24
0
499.19
0.00
1854
76
19
57
126.90
0.00
2305
98
24
74
177.77
0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4
Choice of Rule-based Fiscal Regime
Dependent variable: dummy for rule-based fiscal regime (rule-based regime=1, other regime=0)
Estimation methods: Discrete-choice panel data models
Sample: 24-75 Countries, 1975-2005
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Government budget balance
Dependency ratio
Expenditure procyclicality (10 
years)
Government stability
GDP per capita
Constant
0.174
(0.03)
-54.833 ***
(5.05)
-2.18 **
(2.38)
0.149
(1.27)
30.011 ***
(7.50)
-
-
1.732
(0.25)
-57.268 
***
(5.33)
-1.990 **
(2.20)
-
-
31.507 ***
(7.81)
-
-
35.365 ***
(6.79)
-51.562 
***
(7.94)
-1.531 ***
(3.23)
0.357 ***
(4.40)
-
-
-
-
8.337
(1.29)
-42.595 ***
(5.37)
-2.195 ***
(2.84)
0.262 **
(2.38)
23.33 ***
(17.36)
-209.577 ***
(14.47)
11.785 *
(1.87)
-45.096 
***
(7.04)
-1.945 **
(2.51)
-
-
24.688 ***
(17.77)
-217.869 
***
(14.65)
36.811 
***
(7.15)
-45.996 
***
(7.59)
-1.362 
***
(2.89)
0.377 
***
(4.59)
-
-
18.109 
***
(5.35)
Observations
Countries
  Countries with a rule-based 
fiscal regime
  Countries without rule-based 
fiscal regime
  (control group)
LR statistic
p-value
712
24
24
0
529.3
0.00
712
24
24
0
527.7
0.00
712
24
24
0
310.4
0.00
2005
75
24
51
477.3
0.00
2055
75
24
51
604.0
0.00
2005
75
24
51
113.8
0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5
Cyclicality of Monetary Policy
Dependent Variable: Nominal Interest Rate Deviation from Long-run Value
Estimation Method: GMM-Instrumental Variables
Sample: 84 Countries, 1984-2007
GMM
Hodrick-Prescott
Filter
GMM
First-Difference
Filter
Lagged dependent variable
Inflation Rate deviation from Long-run value
Output Gap
Output Gap * Institutional Quality
-0.281
(0.000)
0.367
(0.000)
-0.632
(0.000)
0.009
(0.001)
-0.271
(0.000)
0.339
(0.000)
-0.559
(0.000)
0.009
(0.002)
Observations
Countries
Sargan-Statistic (p-value)
1336
84
0.089
1252
84
0.145
Note: p-values reported in parenthesis. Hodrick-Prescott and First Difference filters were used to extract 
the cyclical components of the dependent variable, inflation, currency depreciation, and output.
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel.  Macroeconomic Regimes, Policies …
(IELAT – Enero  2011)
Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos – Universidad de Alcalá      |     23
Table 6
Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy I
Dependent Variable: Government Spending Deviations from its long–Run Value
Estimation Method: GMM-Instrumental Variables 
Sample: 112 Countries, 1984-2008
.
GMM
Hodrick-Prescott
Filter
GMM
First-Difference
Filter
Lagged dependent variable
Output Gap
Output Gap * Institutional Quality
0.147
(0.000)
1.649
(0.000)
-0.020
(0.000)
-0.098
(0.000)
1.546
(0.000)
-0.017
(0.000)
Observations
Countries
Sargan-Statistic (p-value)
2269
112
0.137
2157
112
0.453
Note: p-values reported in parenthesis. Hodrick-Prescott and First Difference filters were used to extract 
the cyclical components of the dependent variable and output
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Table 7
Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy II
Dependent Variable: Fiscal Indicator (as percentage of GDP, in log differences)
Estimation Method: Panel Instrumental Variables 1/
Sample: 83-90 Countries, 1970-2005
Budget Balance Revenue Expenditure
Real Output Growth
(in log differences)
Real Output Growth x Financial Openness
(FO: Foreign liabilities as % GDP, logs)
Real Output Growth x Financial Depth
(FD: Dom. Credit to Private Sector as % GDP, logs)
Real Output Growth x Institutional Quality
(IQ: ICRG Index of Political Risk)
Real Output Growth x Democracy
(Democracy: Polity Score)
Fiscal indicator, lagged
(% of GDP, in log differences)
Terms of trade, lagged
(in logs)
War Dummy
(Dummy = 1 if internal or external war)
-2.061 **
(0.87)
0.174 **
(0.08)
0.133 **
(0.06)
0.017 **
(0.01)
-0.023 **
(0.01)
-0.250 **
(0.03)
-0.002
(0.01)
-0.009 **
(0.00)
2.557
(2.74)
-0.220
(0.27)
-0.221
(0.24)
-0.016
(0.01)
0.035
(0.02)
-0.145 **
(0.02)
0.117 **
(0.02)
0.000
(0.001)
11.431 **
(3.93)
-0.953 **
(0.36)
-0.811 **
(0.27)
-0.087 **
(0.03)
0.135 **
(0.05)
-0.135 **
(0.03)
0.087 **
(0.03)
0.025 *
(0.02)
Observations
Countries
Adjusted R2
1983
90
0.146
1882
83
0.135
2051
90
0.253
1/ We instrument real output growth with lagged values of real output growth, current and lagged 
terms of trade changes, current and lagged growth in external demand, current and lagged changes in 
foreign interest rates.
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
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Table 8
Deviation of Inflation Rates from Inflation Targets
Dependent Variable: Absolute Deviation of Inflation from Inflation Target (percentage points)
Estimation Method: OLS and Fixed-Effects
Sample: 19 Countries, 1990-2003 (quarterly data)
Full sample Stationary inflation sub-sample
OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects
C
Dependent variable (-1)
Dependent variable (-2)
Dependent variable (-3)
Nominal Exchange Rate Variation (-1)
Oil Price trend deviation
Oil Price trend deviation (-1)
Oil Price trend deviation (-2)
Central Bank Independence
Sovereign Spread Premium
0.255
(0.001)
0.855
(0.000)
-0.192
(0.006)
-0.080
(0.118)
0.007
(0.146)
0.007
(0.024)
-0.008
(0.035)
0.007
(0.022)
-0.204
(0.003)
0.069
(0.001)
0.340
(0.008)
0.788
(0.000)
-0.166
(0.014)
-0.142
(0.006)
0.004
(0.428)
0.007
(0.039)
-0.008
(0.037)
0.006
(0.049)
-
-
0.119
(0.030)
0.090
(0.335)
1.012
(0.000)
-0.301
(0.000)
-0.043
(0.500)
0.012
(0.027)
0.014
(0.001)
-0.014
(0.009)
0.009
(0.044)
-0.260
(0.004)
0.128
(0.000)
0.215
(0.080)
0.952
(0.000)
-0.285
(0.001)
-0.104
(0.111)
0.006
(0.362)
0.013
(0.002)
-0.013
(0.012)
0.007
(0.093)
-
-
0.135
(0.000)
Observations
Countries
Adjusted R2
358
19
0.53
358
19
0.55
287
11
0.81
287
11
0.82
Note: p-values reported in parenthesis. Lag number identified for each independent variable in 
parenthesis.
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Table 9
Growth
Dependent variable is growth rate of real GDP per capita
Estimation method: GMM-IV System Estimator
Sample: 77 Countries, 1970–2004
Aid/GDP
Aid/GDP squared
RER misalignment
Peace onset
Postconflict period 1
Postconflict period 2
Financial development (in logs)
Interactions
  RER misalignment * aid/GDP
  
  RER misalignment * financial development
Standard Control Variables
  Initial GDP per capita (in logs)
  Initial GDP per capita (cyclical component)
  Inflation (in logs)
  Government expenditures/GDP (in logs)
  Human capital investment (in logs)
  Rule of law
  
0.2738*** 
(0.031)
-0.0037***
(0.001)
-0.0164*
(0.009)
-0.0030
(0.004)
0.0378*** 
(0.006)
-0.0273*** 
(0.008)
0.0064*** 
(0.002)
-0.3139***
(0.114)
0.0054*
(0.003)
-0.0073***
(0.002)
-0.1836***
(0.014)
-0.0184***
(0.002)
-0.0350***
(0.004)
0.0217***
(0.004)
0.0184***
(0.002)
Observations
Countries
Specification tests (p-values)
  Sargan test
  Second-order serial correlation
367
77
0.38
0.29
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel.  Macroeconomic Regimes, Policies …
(IELAT – Enero  2011)
Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos – Universidad de Alcalá      |     27
Table 10
Growth Volatility I
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of Growth in Real GDP per capita
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator
Sample: 75 Countries, 1970-2000
Terms of 
Trade
Changes
Foreign 
Growth
World 
Interest Rate
Changes
Regional 
Capital
Inflows
External 
Shocks
(aggregate)
Control Variables
Inflation Volatility
   (S.D. annual log differences of CPI)
RER Overvaluation
   (Proportional index, overvaluation if >100)
Systemic Banking Crises
   (Frequency of years under crises: 0-1)
Openness:
Trade Openness (TO)
   (Real Exports and Imports to GDP, in logs)
Financial Openness (FO)
   (Stock Equity-related Foreign liabilities to GDP, logs)
Volatility of Foreign Shocks
Volatility of Foreign Shocks (aggregate)   1/
   (weighted volatility of trade/financial shocks)
Volatility of Terms of Trade Changes
   (S.D. annual log differences of ToT)
Volatility of Foreign Growth Volatility
  (S.D. annual log differences of Foreign Growth)
Volatility of World Real Interest Rate
  (S.D. annual log differences of G-7 Interest Rates)
Volatility of Regional Capital Inflows
   (S.D. ratio of Regional Capital Flows to GDP)
Interaction: Openness and Volatility of Foreign Shock
TO * Volatility (Foreign Shock)
FO * Volatility (Foreign Shock)
0.169 **
(0.02)
0.001 **
(0.00)
0.200 **
(0.04)
-0.103
(0.16)
-0.015 *
(0.01)
…
-0.633 **
(0.25)
0.429 **
(0.05)
0.297 **
(0.07)
0.200 **
(0.03)
0.184 **
(0.06)
-0.008 **
(0.00)
0.169 **
(0.04)
0.001 **
(0.00)
0.254 **
(0.06)
0.242 **
(0.05)
-0.036 **
(0.01)
…
0.127 **
(0.02)
0.015
(0.26)
0.282 **
(0.08)
0.203 **
(0.04)
0.118 **
(0.06)
-0.010 **
(0.00)
0.123 **
(0.03)
0.002 **
(0.00)
0.240 **
(0.04)
0.140 **
(0.04)
-0.041 **
(0.01)
…
0.130 **
(0.02)
0.417 **
(0.04)
-0.646 **
(0.26)
0.207 **
(0.03)
0.219 **
(0.07)
0.019 **
(0.01)
0.114 **
(0.03)
0.001 **
(0.00)
0.214 **
(0.05)
0.172 **
(0.03)
-0.043 **
(0.00)
…
0.129 **
(0.02)
0.398 **
(0.05)
0.276 **
(0.07)
0.706 **
(0.22)
-0.122 **
(0.06)
-0.026 **
(0.01)
0.084 **
(0.02)
0.002 **
(0.00)
0.280 **
(0.05)
-0.056
(0.08)
-0.005
(0.01)
-0.584 *
(0.34)
…
…
…
…
0.421 **
(0.08)
-0.026 **
(0.00)
Observations
Countries
Specification Tests (p-values)
  - Sargan Test
  - 2nd. Order Correlation
364
75
(0.48)
(0.26)
364
75
(0.33)
(0.27)
364
75 
(0.34)
(0.22)
364
75
(0.35)
(0.34)
364
75
(0.25)
(0.24)
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  
1/ Our measure of the aggregate volatility of external shocks is calculated using the regression coefficients of 
the volatility of terms of trade shocks, foreign growth, world real interest rate fluctuations, and capital inflows 
to the region (as percentage of GDP) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 11
Growth Volatility II
Dependent Variable: Standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP per capita (in logs)
Methodology: Country and time-specific Fixed Effects
Sample: 82 countries, 1975-2005
Trade Openness (TO)
  Trade: Real exports and imports      
   (as % of GDP, in logs)
Financial Openness (FO)
  Foreign Liabilities
   (as % of GDP, in logs)
  Foreign Assets and Liabilities
   (as % of GDP, in logs)
Domestic Conditions
  Income per capita
   (in logs)
  Inflation
   (CPI inflation rate, in logs)
  REER overvaluation index
   (in logs)
  Systemic Banking Crisis
   (average frequency of systemic banking crises)
  Fiscal Policy Volatility 1/
  Monetary Policy Volatility 1/
External Conditions
  Terms of Trade Volatility
   (std. dev. of terms of trade shocks, in logs)
  International Real Interest Rate Volatility
  (std. dev. of the prime loan rate, in logs)
-0.025
(0.13)
-0.169 **
(0.07)
0.155
(0.14)
0.044
(0.11)
0.150 **
(0.07)
0.073
(0.10)
0.217 **
(0.05)
0.196 **
(0.05)
0.026
(0.02)
0.173 **
(0.08)
-0.019
(0.14)
-0.180 **
(0.08)
0.184
(0.14)
0.042
(0.11)
0.151 **
(0.07)
0.071
(0.10)
0.215 **
(0.05)
0.195 **
(0.05)
0.025
(0.02)
0.163 **
(0.08)
Observations
Countries
Adjusted R2
474
82
0.193
474
82
0.193
Note: The numbers in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are the robust standard errors. 
1/ Monetary and Fiscal Policy Volatility are calculated using the methodology of Fatas and Mihov (2003, 
2006). For fiscal policy volatility we regress government spending (as a ratio to GDP) on output growth 
and lagged government spending, and we instrument output growth with lagged output growth and 
current and lagged values of oil prices. The same methodology is applied to monetary policy using the 
ratio of money supply to GDP.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 12
Inflation
Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: Fixed-Effects and Random-Effects IV
Sample: 65 Countries, 1975-2005
Fixed Effects 
IV
Random Effects 
IV
Inflation Related Variables
    Lagged Inflation
    Hyper Inflation
    
    High Inflation
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
    Inflation Targeting
    Exchange Rate Targeting
Openness 
    Trade Openness
    Financial Openness
    Relevant External Inflation
Structural / Institutional Variables
    Fiscal Surplus
    Income per Capita
    Domestic Private Credit
    Democratic Accountability
Cyclical Domestic and Foreign Variales
    Cyclical component of Oil Prices
    National Output Gap
    Foreign Output Gap (weighted by GDP)
Constant
0.160 ***
(1.97)
0.348 ***
(9.29)
0.232 ***
(14.02)
-0.051 ***
(5.41)
-0.029 ***
(7.70)
-0.009
(0.81)
-0.013 ***
(5.94)
0.210 ***
(3.11)
-0.204 ***
(5.30)
-0.040 ***
(3.67)
0.018 *
(1.87)
-0.002
(1.22)
0.019 **
(2.01)
0.238 ***
(3.60)
-0.204
(0.93)
0.467 ***
(4.80)
-0.033
(0.22)
0.488 ***
(6.54)
0.308 ***
(8.29)
-0.045 ***
(4.25)
-0.037 ***
(5.97)
-0.012 **
(2.15)
-0.011 ***
(4.90)
0.412 ***
(4.77)
-0.179 ***
(4.46)
0.012 ***
(3.09)
-0.059 ***
(4.65)
-0.003 *
(1.65)
0.017
(1.48)
0.057
(0.55)
-0.406
(1.40)
0.086 ***
(3.68)
Observations
Countries
Hausman test (RE vs FE) p-value
R2 
1574
65
0.75
1574
65
0.00
0.79
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Figure 1
Number of Countries by Exchange-Rate Regimes, 1975-2005
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Source:  Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008a).
Note: de-facto exchange rate regime classification. The non-flexible category encompasses intermediate 
and fixed exchange-rate regimes.
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Figure 2
Number of Countries with Money-based and Inflation-Targeting Monetary Regimes, 1975-
2005
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Source: Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008b).
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Figure 3
Number of Countries with Rule-based Fiscal Regimes, 1975-2005
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Source: Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008d).
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Figure 4
Trade Openness in the World and by Regions, 1975-2005
Source: Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008f).
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Figure 5
Financial Openness in the World and by Regions, 1975-2005
Source: Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008f).
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